Forecast: Changing dynamics in northwest syria

Introduction

On 5 March, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Turkish and Russian Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The agreement provides for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the establishment of a 6km security corridor along the Latakia–Aleppo M4 highway, and the deployment of joint Russian–Turkish patrols along the road from 15 March. The agreement protects Russia’s (and Damascus) interests by securing key strategic highways while also preventing a loss of Turkish territory by halting any further offensives by the Government of Syria (GoS) and Russia. The EU and the US welcomed the Russian–Turkish ceasefire. Joseph Borrell, head of Foreign Policy, stated that increased humanitarian aid to the region is a prerequisite for the agreement's success. The US State Department also issued a statement welcoming the agreement, describing it as a "spark of hope" and considered that the commitment of the GoS to a ceasefire is an essential part of the deal.5

However, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Hurras Ad-Din, the two dominant militant groups in northwest Syria, issued two separate statements rejecting the agreement. In its statement, HTS considered that the deal enabled Russia to establish control of the territories without a fight and stressed that the path of armed resistance and jihad must continue, no matter how high the cost. HTS thanked the Turkish government for its stance in support of the revolution and the locals of Idleb, and encouraged it to help displaced people to return to their communities. Hurras Ad-Din, a group strongly affiliated with Al-Qaeda, released a 23-minute audio recording of its leader, Abu Hummam al-Shami, describing the agreement as an international conspiracy of infidels against jihad in Syria. In his speech, Shami called on the Mujahideen to continue the war against enemies of the religion, including President Bashar al-Assad and his followers, Jews, Christians, and Shiites.

On 1 May, demonstrations against HTS erupted across several towns in Idleb governorate. The protests came after HTS suppressed civil demonstrations attempting to prevent the opening of a new commercial crossing with Government of Syria (GoS)-held areas in the western Aleppo countryside, killing one civilian and wounding seven others.

On 29 April, local sources reported that Turkish military forces in the area erected dirt barriers along the Maaret Elnaasan–Meznaz road to prevent HTS from opening the commercial crossing. The initiative came in conjunction with the dropping of Turkish reconnaissance plane leaflets on various regions of Idleb governorate, asking people to cooperate with the Turkish army in its quest to achieve lasting stability in the area. The flyers were dropped following confrontations between HTS and the Turkish forces during the latter's attempt to disperse local demonstrations (known as the Al Karama protests) aimed at preventing the deployment of joint Turkish–Russian patrols on the Latakia–Damascus M4 highway. The confrontation reportedly resulted in the killing of five protesters and the wounding of three members of the Turkish army. On 19 March, the Turkish Ministry of Defense announced the death of two Turkish soldiers and the injury of a third in an attack by extremist groups targeting a Turkish military patrol along the M4 highway.

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

The 5 March agreement is a revival of the Demilitarized Zone Agreement (DMZ) signed in Sochi, Russia, in September 2018.8 Through ten action points, the DMZ agreement stipulated a reduction of hostilities, establishment of a 15–20 km demilitarized zone free of extremist groups, restoration of cross-line civilian and commercial transit on the (Latakia–Aleppo) M4 and the (Aleppo–Damascus) M5 highways, and the deployment of joint Russian–Turkish patrols and unmanned aerial vehicles along the transit routes by the end of 2018. The Russian government continued to use Turkey's failure to implement these terms to justify military operations against opposition-held areas in Idleb to secure control over the M4 and M5 transit routes. Unlike previous agreements, there are two main factors indicating that Turkey is determined to implement the 5 March agreement and remove the reasons that could lead Russia and the GoS to launch future attacks on opposition-held areas in northwest Syria.

The first factor is related to Turkey's noticeable determination to deploy joint patrols along the M4 highway, despite reluctance from the extremist groups in the areas and local communities. On March 19, two Turkish soldiers were killed and a third wounded as a result of an attack by an unspecified radical group during their patrol on the M4 highway. Although the Turkish Ministry of Defense did not specify the group responsible for the attack, local sources indicate that Hurras Ad-Din is likely responsible for the attack. Moreover, the Turkish government took extreme measures to disperse local demonstrations that aimed to prevent the passage of the Russian patrols. On 13 April, the Turkish government deployed more than 500 riot police, carrying batons and shields, to break up a civilian sit-in on the M4 highway. On 26 April, during another demonstration, Turkish forces used live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators resulting in the death of five protesters and wounding three members of the Turkish army.

The second indicator of Turkey's intention to sustain stability in opposition-controlled northwest Syria is that Turkey has announced its intention to supply the remaining opposition-controlled territories in Idleb and western Aleppo with electricity from Turkey. On 24 March, the General Electricity Corporation of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) announced the signing of an agreement to deliver power from Turkey to Idleb and western Aleppo communities within three months. Local sources reported that an exclusive contract had been signed between an unidentified private Syrian company and the Turkish AK Energy company to extend the electricity line from the Turkish border to the nearest transfer station in Idleb governorate. Turk Telecom also provides internet services to SSG-held areas, and a privately owned Turkish company feeds internet to the SSG-owned Syria Connect.

Based on the above, if Turkey wants to maintain stability in the opposition-held northwest, it must remove the reasons that could lead Russia and the GoS to launch future attacks in the area. This report presents three possible scenarios for Turkey to remove these reasons: The first scenario assumes that Turkey succeeds in dissolving HTS and integrating the SSG with the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government (SIG). The second scenario presumes that Turkey pursues HTS into deradicalization while the SSG remains intact. The third scenario presumes that Turkey fails to reach an understanding with HTS and launches a military offensive to eliminate HTS and the remaining extremist groups.