Syria year in review 2022

Executive summary 

Security

The frontlines in Syria remained largely stagnant this year as no major offensives and ground incursions took place. However, notable security developments, localized within each zone of control did take place, while Turkey conducted airstrikes and bombardment against the SDF in Syria, and threatened to launch a ground offensive.

In Syrian government-held areas, the most significant security developments largely took place in the quasi-autonomous As-Sweida governorate. There, local militias decided to put an end to the reign of terror by armed groups and gangs affiliated with the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID). The militias attacked the notorious Qouwat al-Fajr headquarters in Atil township (As-Sweida subdistrict) – Qouwat al-Fajr had angered many by targeting some of the governorate’s most influential families. The clashes resulted in the closure of the As-Sweida–Damascus highway for almost two days and were followed by a crackdown on the remaining MID-affiliated militias located in Qanawat, Salkhad, and As-Sweida city.

In outgoing developments in the northeast, the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian government forces continue to conduct counter-ISIS operations, throughout the governorates of Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and the Syrian Badia. The SDF and the International Coalition conducted joint operations targeting ISIS members, leaders, and explosives manufacturers throughout 2022, particu- larly following an attempt made by ISIS members to break out of Ghweiran prison; it took the SDF weeks to successfully defeat ISIS combatants in and around the prison and later capture those who managed to flee. Syrian government forces, with the assistance of the Russian air force, conducted several airstrikes and combing operations in government-held Deir- ez-Zor to prevent ISIS from controlling the major roads passing through the governorate; ISIS tempo- rarily took control of major roads connected to the Al-Ward oil field.

Turkey continued to threaten the SDF, accusing the US-led Coalition-supported armed umbrella of affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it classifies as a terrorist group. On 2 February, Turkish forces launched operation Winter Eagle in northern Syria and Iraq; the operation consisted of airstrikes against targeted ammunition warehouses, hideouts, military posts and headquarters. Turkish media would later call the operation a “success.” Turkey then launched operation Claw Sword on 20 November following a deadly bombing in Istanbul, for which the PKK was blamed. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan renewed threats of establishing a 30km buffer zone along the Turkish–Syrian border, identifying Ain Al Arab (Kobani) as his next target. The ground invasion never materialized, likely as a strategic calculation by Turkey, given the high degree of pressure to abstain from global powers such as Russia and the US. Claw Sword, in the end, manifested as widespread aerial bombardments which would cripple the Autonomous Administration’s fuel production and service provision for weeks into winter 2022. Erdogan, up for reelection in May 2023, continues to threaten a ground offensive to secure the border area.

In the northwest, major incidents revolved around intra-opposition clashes that involved Al-Jabha Al-Shamiyah against Ahrar al-Sham and the Al-Hamzah Division. Many observers, including HAT, viewed Al-Jabha Al-Shamiyah attacks on Ahrar al-Sham in June as political infighting and disagreement over allegiances within the Syrian National Army. The clashes prompted Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to intervene alongside Ahrar al-Sham (a longtime rival that it had previously defeated), and took control over several villages in Afrin subdistrict. More violent clashes took place later in October when Al-Jabha Al-Shamiyah attacked the Al-Hamzah Division, again prompting HTS to intervene; in this instance, clashes took place on a larger scale, enabling them to reach the outskirts of Azaz city. In both cases, Turkish mediation of the dispute led to a ceasefire among armed actors, though HTS would later withdraw.

Economy

The overall economic situation in Syria deteriorated to unprecedented levels. The Syrian pound plummeted by 91% in total in 2022, surpassing the 7,000 SYP per USD mark for the first time. Household purchasing power and economic productivity has dramatically collapsed, as markets consequently experienced several shocks throughout the year; chronic shortages of certain food items in addition to skyrocketing prices have created widespread hardship and reduced market activity. Moreover, the government has implemented more austerity measures to attempt to balance its budget, an indication that the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves are low. The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance have both attempted to stabilize the black-market exchange rate through several means; the official exchange rates have shifted upwards several times in 2022, while the government sold more debt and opened the opportunity for individuals to purchase treasury bonds, previously exclusive to Syrian banks and exchange companies. Additionally, the Central Bank and security agencies have implemented measures to siphon more foreign currency out of the market; however, these measures have only served to further constrain the economy and its foreign currency-generating sectors.

A shift in geopolitically-sensitive supply chains, particularly influenced by the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, has converged with Syria’s pre-existing problems and further exacerbated the country’s economic woes. The fallout from the eastern European conflict, as well as growing global inflation and disruptions in global supply chains, has resulted in price increases in Syrian and Turkish markets. Moreover, the increasing sanctions and wartime expenditure of Russia, the Syrian government’s primary patron, have further restricted the government’s access to foreign currency.

Syria’s wheat and fuel shortages have also intensified in 2022. The increase in global oil and wheat prices, in part due to the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, has made it more difficult for the Syrian government to purchase either commodity. Russian wheat exporting companies have increased prices while freight shipping costs (including shipping insurance) have made it nearly impossible for the government to import wheat without external credit or assistance. Reports throughout 2022 emerged of shipments of stolen Ukrainian wheat making their way to Syria.

In government-held areas, officials blamed insufficient oil imports and disrupted supply lines from the Autonomous Administration for oil shortages. Iran, the government’s main oil supplier, is reportedly now demanding that the government pay for its oil upfront instead of using credit; the country has been experiencing economic turmoil with its own currency falling to an all-time low in December. Having to pay up-front is likely to further complicate oil procurement and cause more fuel shortages into 2023.

In Autonomous Administration-held areas, the threat of a Turkish offensive forced the Administration to redirect its fuel supplies to both the SDF and government military forces, initially exacerbating the shortage. The Turkish bombardment, part of operation Claw Sword then damaged several oil production facilities, decreasing domestic fuel production.

Politics

There were several national and regional political developments in 2022 consisting of conciliatory steps by the government towards the international community, continued representation of the Baath party on the local administration level, and moves towards the Syrian government’s regional reintegration. On a national level, Bashar al-Assad issued a general amnesty in April for citizens tried by the counter-terrorism court – except for ‘acts of terror’ and those which led to the death of a person. While there was optimism surrounding the president's amnesty, which government officials referred to as “historic” and a “national reconciliation,” it turned out to be a disappointment. The lack of coordination between government agencies, bureaucratic hurdles, and suspected insincerity in its implementation impeded its effectiveness, leading to the release of a few hundred people only.

Local Administration Elections took place in government-held areas in September amid a decline in governance and socioeconomic circumstances. Government officials described the elections as a transition from central governance to local administration units. The elections had 59,498 approved candidates (25,000 compared to the 2018 elections) who competed for over 19,086 seats for local administrative units (governorate councils, city councils, and municipalities) across all governorates, including government-held Idleb. While government officials said that the high number of candidates was an indicator of local commitment to the democratic process, widespread interference and influence on the electoral process to manipulate election results were evident. Election results were announced between 20 and 22 September; the Baath-supported electoral lists secured significant victories in Idleb, Aleppo, and As-Sweida governorates. They were met with apathy by the majority of the population.

The Syrian government continued settlement procedures — agreements conducted between the Syrian government and local communities — in 2022. Settlement centers were opened in government-held Deir-ez-Zor, Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and As-Sweida governorates. The settlements were largely unsuccessful in attracting many listed civilians, likely due to the lack of trust in the government, and fear of exposure to arrest (or even assassination). The settlement centers largely only managed to attract members of pro-government and Iranian-backed armed groups who sought to clear their records.

On a regional level, the Syrian government has slowly continued its rapprochement with Arab countries in the face of US objections and has made progress in reopening its relationship with Turkey. Syrian–UAE relations continued to improve with Assad visiting the UAE in March, his first visit to an Arab country since 2011. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah Bin Zayed, in turn, visited Damascus in January to meet with Assad to continue discussing ways to enhance bilateral relations. The US expressed its “profound disappointment” in the UAE’s improved relations, stressing that it does not support efforts to rehabilitate Assad or his government in Damascus. For its part, Algeria, host of the Arab League summit this year in November, led an initiative to include Syrian officials but in the end, was unable to do so.

A potential warming of Turkish–Syrian relations in late 2022, has led to observers unsure over the future of north and northwest Syria, particularly in relation to the remaining armed actors, political groups, and communities opposed to the Syrian government – not to mention the large number of IDPs in the area, many of whom were subjected to localized reconciliation agreements over the past six years. Mevlut Cavusoglu, the Turkish foreign minister, spoke of the “need to bring the opposition and regime together for reconciliation somehow”, and confirmed that both countries’ intelligence agencies were holding meetings. Cavusoglu and the Turkish government’s calls for a rapprochement were met with large protests in opposition-held areas and condemnatory statements by opposition figures, including the leader of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. Despite the protests, overt progress towards rapprochement culminated in a trilateral meeting between the Russian, Turkish and Syrian defense ministers and intelligence chiefs in Moscow on 28 December.

Humanitarian

The humanitarian situation in Syria continued to deteriorate with the price of essential items, including heating, continuing to increase and a cholera outbreak threatening to turn into a public health crisis. The potential collapse of a fragile cross-border resolution looms in the background, threatening to cut off northwest Syria from much-needed humanitarian aid.

The cross-border aid resolution was extended twice in 2022, the first in January when the UN Security Council extended the use of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing for aid deliveries for six months, as part of Resolution 2585 (agreed in July 2021). The second resolution was agreed by the Security Council in July with the adoption of Resolution 2642 (expiring 10 January 2023) – the July resolution this time called for a separate agreement in January 2023, rather than an extension of the current resolution as had been the case the previous year. The extension came after the UNSC agreed on the Russian requirements which in- cluded increased cross-line aid delivery, and encouraged the convening of a group for informal interactive dialogue every two months to regularly review the implementation of the resolution and the progress in early recovery projects.

Since 2021, and the adoption of resolutions 2585 and 2642 (which include requirements for cross-line aid delivery, controlled by Damascus, into Idelb), only 10 aid convoys (153 trucks) entered Idleb from government-held areas in Aleppo. In 2022, only 82 aid trucks entered through the cross-line mechanism, compared to 8,390 aid trucks through the cross-border mechanism, which constitute less than 1% of the total humanitarian aid delivered to the northwest. The Bab al-Hawa border crossing is the only remaining international crossing through which UN aid is allowed to enter northwest Syria, home to more than 4 million Syrians, including 2.8 million IDPs. Households in northwest Syria continue to experience difficult humanitarian conditions amid the economic crisis, exacerbated by Turkey’s economic issues in 2022 – Turkey’s annualized inflation reached close to 85% in November 2022. At least 2.8 million people, including 65% women and children, depend on aid provided by the current UN-led cross-border response to meet their basic needs every month through the cross-border delivery mechanism.

 Syria experienced a nationwide cholera outbreak starting mid-September 2022, the first seen since 2009. The outbreak was caused by several factors: The country’s water infrastructure has been heavily damaged following a decade of conflict, hindering the local population’s access to clean water. Groundwater levels, particularly in the Euphrates river valley and its tributaries, which provides irrigation, hydroelectric power and water to much of the northeast, have fallen to dangerously low levels, forming polluted swamps and restricting access to potable water. Drought has also hit northern Syria, leaving farmers desperate to find alternative means to irrigate crops – the practice of using wastewater (often contaminated with sewage), became widespread, further contaminating crops. Additionally, water stress in northeast Syria was exacerbated by Turkey's alleged disruption of water supply to Alouk water station, which serves more than 460,000 in Al-Hasakeh governorate. Inconsistent water availability across Syria, particularly in the northeast, forced the local population to rely on water trucks, which are often unregulated, with water companies accused of selling contaminated water from the Euphrates and boreholes with little to no regulation or quality control. In IDP camps in the northwest, their proximity to open sewage sites was also a factor. The outbreak led the Syrian government and de-facto administrations across the country to implement strict measures, with some international support, to prevent the outbreak from spreading further. The education sectors in the northeast and northwest faced significant disruptions, with teachers striking for more pay, better working conditions, and against disagreements over governing bodies and the curriculum. In the northwest, districts in Turkey oversee education in SIG-controlled areas, while in Idleb, teachers held strikes throughout the year, many having worked unpaid for long periods. Moreover, the Autonomous Administration closed and fined schools teaching the Syrian government’s internationally recognized curriculum, in an attempt to introduce its own throughout its areas.

With winter approaching, families throughout Syria faced challenges of poor government distribution of diesel for heating, and soaring fuel prices on the black market. Locals in government-held areas are reliant, to a large extent, on government subsidies and deliveries of fuel for heating during the winter. The government’s subsidy allocation system, part of state support for the poorest communities, was heavily cut in 2022; citizens’ fuel allocations in winter were either cut completely, or reduced. The Ministry of Fuel and Mineral resources also struggled to keep up with the demand for oil deliveries. Consumers and households turned to alternative methods to heat their homes, with firewood the most economical and widely available, particularly in forested areas. Also used as fuel were cypress cones, olive cakes, and animal manure, and unconventional sources such as nutshells, alcohol-based fuels, or sometimes dangerous alternatives like waste and plastic. Deforestation and illicit logging activities have led to a growing illegal economy, and contributed to climatic concerns, related to soil erosion and land degradation–without proper measures in place to protect forests, these issues could escalate.